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ABSTRACT
In this paper I propose and evaluate a grading standard design that allows for
multiple grading standards across the grade distribution. I show that making it
harder for a student to receive a higher grade when at a higher point in the grade
distribution than to receive a higher grade when at some point lower leads to larger
test score gains overall. Effects differ by race, gender, and at different points in the
achievement distribution. Much of this analysis follows the method used by Betts
and Grogger (2003) and I present my replications of their results for comparison
purposes.
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I Introduction
The use of grades as a student incentive mechanism as well as a signaling device in
elementary through higher education is pervasive. For teachers grades can be seen
as a low-financial-cost instrument to induce student effort and for employers and
post-secondary institutions as a quantifiable, though imperfect, metric of achieve-
ment. Grades are analogous to performance based compensation in agent/employer
relationships from which empirical evidence suggests a strong link between com-
pensation and effort.1
Theoretical work by Betts (1998) and Costrell (1994) model future labor mar-
ket earnings as an endogenous function of the achievement groups students sort
themselves into based on a grading standard. If a student meets the standard
the student signals a higher expected productivity measure than if the student
does not meet the standard which is rewarded accordingly in the labor market.
Betts goes further to show that with heterogeneous ability levels, a barrier of abil-
ity exists such that those with ability above such a barrier will choose to meet
the standard and those below will not. Since actual achievement from secondary
school goes unobserved by colleges, universities, and employers they must rely in
part on the rough measure that comes from grades to determine admittance or
wages. Students in turn achieve the necessary amount in school to send the best
signal facing their constraint of effort and ability. Then, a naive lever to increase
achievement for groups with the requisite ability and excess effort would be to
increase the required level of achievement to meet or exceed a standard (i.e. raise
grading standards). However, concern must also be given to students at the margin
of getting a given grade who may be restricted to one lower or to students that
must channel effort from other activities (other than leisure)2 which could lead to
1See, e.g., Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990); Lazear (2000); Chevalier and Ellison (1999).
2Future research investigates this possibility.
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potentially worse outcomes for the student and could exacerbate wage inequality
among certain groups. It follows that assessing the impact of grading standards
and determining an optimal grading standard are important from a policy perspec-
tive. Much existing empirical work has evaluated the impact of grading standards
while this paper proposes and evaluates a grading standard design.
Recent empirical work by Figlio and Lucas (2004) and Betts and Grogger (2003)
presents the costs and benefits to students in terms of degree completion, educa-
tional attainment, test score gains, disciplinary infractions, and future labor mar-
ket earnings from different school or teacher specific grading standards and Lillard
and DeCicca (2001) looks at the propensity to drop-out of high school as a result
of stricter graduation standards. Both Figlio and Lucas and Betts and Grogger
find that students exposed to higher grading standards perform better on average
than students exposed to lower grading standards for a variety of performance
measures and Lillard and DeCicca shows that higher graduation standards can
increase dropout rates. Bonesrønning (2004) has also demonstrated that the ef-
fects noted by Betts and Grogger and Figlio and Lucas are present for Norwegian
high school students that are exposed to a higher grading standard, employing a
within school approach similar to Figlio and Lucas. Oettinger (2002) investigates
the behavior of students to discrete grade outcomes, finding that students tend to
cluster their performance around the visible grade outcomes when faced with an
absolute grading standard.
In this paper I introduce and evaluate a grading standard design that allows for
multiple grading standards across the grade distribution for any given school. The
grading standard design presented in this paper assesses the impact on student
outcomes from making it harder for a student to receive a higher grade when at a
higher point in the grade distribution than for a student to receive a higher grade
2
when at some point lower in the grade distribution (e.g. harder to receive an A
over an A- than to receive a C over a C- in terms of premiums on achievement).
This differs from prior empirical research which modeled a single grading standard
per school or teacher. The implication from this design is that when grading
standards are allowed to be greater at points higher in the grade distribution than
points lower test score gains increase on average with the largest gains occurring
at the top of the test score distribution. Much of this analysis follows the method
used by Betts and Grogger and I also present my replication of their results.
I begin by discussing how grading standards can be modeled at the popula-
tion level that assumes a random assignment of grading standards. In Section II
I describe the High School and Beyond data set, discuss the empirical estima-
tion strategy, and outline the assumptions and limitations concerning the analysis
in this paper where non-random assignment is a concern. Results are shown in
Section III and Section IV concludes.
A The calculation of grading standards from a population
perspective
Previous literature has modeled a single grading standard per school or teacher. In
departing from that model, this paper considers a continuum of grading standards
at each value of the grade distribution. It is instructive to think of both models
from a population perspective and to see the differences therein.
A single grading standard per school3 can be modeled as the school specific
intercept from the following equation:
aij = αj + βgij + γcij + δXij + ij (1)
3We can also think of this in terms of teacher grading standards by comparing student out-
comes across teachers within a school.
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where student i at school j has achievement of aij, a math GPA of gij from courses
cij, and ij is some unobserved idiosyncratic error component with Ei∈j[ij] = ¯.
The vector X includes measures of teacher quality, school quality, and parental
resources. Under this model a school’s grading standard is given by αj (Betts
and Grogger, 2003). Consider students randomly assigned to schools 1, 2. If these
schools are identical except for the manner in which achievement is awarded with
grades conditional upon these factors X then we can express the conditional dif-
ferences in average achievement at the two schools as:
Ei∈j[ai1 − ai2|X, cij] = α1 − α2 (2)
Then, if α1 > α2 school 1 would be considered to have a higher grading standard
than school 2 as it requires more average achievement for the same reward. Since
this grading standard is not a function of math GPA, as we move along the grade
distribution the standard is being modeled as constant.
Now, consider a different model of grading standards where schools have dif-
ferent standards attached to each level of the GPA distribution. Consider the
same setup leading to (1) but with standards at each school varying over the GPA
distribution:
aij = αj + βjgij + γcij + δXij + ij (3)
where the model is identical to (1) except standards include αj and βj for each
school. Consider students randomly assigned to schools 1, 2.
Ei∈j[ai1 − ai2|X, cij, α1 = α2] = (β1 − β2)g (4)
Ei∈j[
∂∆12a
∂g
|X, cij, α1 = α2] = β1 − β2 (5)
It follows that if β1 > β2 school 1 has differentially higher standards than school
2 as the average change in achievement necessary to receive a given higher grade
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at school 1 is greater than that at school 2 with the premium on achievement
increasing by a factor of β1 − β2 as a student moves along the grade distribution.
It is also natural to question to what extent the growth rate of grading stan-
dards across the GPA distribution matters in determining student achievement.
The main text of this document describes the effect of differences in the rate of
increase of achievement across the GPA distribution as modeled in the population
above. In Appendix D, I show results that use proportional changes to construct
grading standards rather than differential changes. The results from the two grad-
ing standards constructions are very similar.
II Data and methods
A High School and Beyond Survey
I use data from 1980, 1982 and 1984 on the 1980 sophomore cohort from the High
School and Beyond (HSB) longitudinal survey. The HSB survey is meant to be
representative of the approximately 3.8 million United States students that were
sophomores in 1980 at 24,725 high schools. Data were collected from approxi-
mately 30,000 students at approximately 1,122 schools in 1980 and 1982, and from
probability samples of approximately 15,000 students in 1984. Schools that were
identified as having 30% or more of a certain population such as black or Hispanic
were oversampled making this analysis particularly useful for looking at the effect
of grading standards on those groups.4
I focus my analysis on the universe of public school students from the 15,000
student probability sample, a subsample of 11,436 students and 854 schools. I also
exclude individuals that were not chosen to participate in the 1980 survey leaving
a sample of 10,548 and 854 schools. When constructing the grading standards
4Unweighted results are shown. Weighted results are similar.
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I require that the student remain at the same school from 10th to 12th grade
and that transcripts and a 12th grade test score be available from at least five
students at each school. The restriction of the sample to those with five or more
representative students was chosen with consideration of the trade-off between
appropriately estimating a slope and intercept for each school in addition to having
enough power for estimation. Less than two percent of the otherwise eligible
students and 10% of the otherwise eligible schools were excluded on this basis.
The results are not sensitive to the cutoff of five. This leaves 7,215 students at 678
schools used to construct grading standards with 8,940 students available for the
outcome regressions.5
Students took exams in math, reading, and science when they were sophomores
in 1980 and again in 1982. For the math exam students were administered a fif-
teen minute exam from which a formula score was computed.6 One advantage of
using the High School and Beyond Survey is that the achievement test adminis-
tered by NCES was not used to determine teacher or student outcomes. Should
students have also been subject to a state test-based accountability system, that
assignment would be random. This removes the complication that comes from
using No Child Left Behind achievement test populations. In studies that use
these student populations an achievement test might alter teacher behavior and so
lower the resources available to students far from the pass/fail margin (Neal and
Schanzenbach, 2010). Care then would need to be given to the possibility that the
achievement distribution affects the probability of neglect. This study is free of
that concern.
51,725 (8,940 - 7,215) additional students are available for outcome regressions as they were
attending schools in 10th grade that had enough other eligible students to enable the construction
of a grading standard for that school.
6The formula score awards 1 point for correct answers and subtracts one quarter point for
incorrect answers.
6
Additional parent and school surveys and administrative data complement the
student surveys. A transcript survey was conducted for a probability sample of
the 1980 sophomores available for the first follow-up. From this survey I am able
to construct a math grade point average and variables that detail the type of math
course and the quantity for each student.7 School level surveys were completed by
school principals in 1980 from which I construct some of the control variables.
B Estimation models
In estimating grading standards I simply add an interaction term to the original
model proposed by Betts and Grogger and will refer to this model as the “Slope
and intercept model”. Specifically, the model is8:
Aij =
nSCH∑
j=1
SCHOOLijαj +
nSCH∑
j=1
(SCHOOLij ∗GPAij)ξj
+
nCOR∑
m=1
ρijmβm +GPAijγ + ij (6)
where Aij is the grade 12 math test score for person i in school j. SCHOOLij is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if student i is in school j and zero otherwise. GPAij is a
calculated math GPA for student i in school j. ρijm is the number of courses of type
m taken by student i at school j. The grading standard is given by the estimated
coefficient on SCHOOL and the coefficient on (SCHOOL∗GPA) in equation (6).
Differences in scale between math GPA and the standardized math test are given
in part by γ and ξj for all schools j. For comparison purposes I also present what
I refer to as the “Intercept only model” which is the specification from Betts and
Grogger and is identical to the model above without the interaction term. The
7For details on this construction see Appendix A.
8See Appendix A for details on how some of the ambiguous components of this regression are
computed.
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resulting grading standard in the intercept only model is given by the coefficient
on SCHOOLij from that model.
9
For the outcome equations I let the effects of the school specific slope and the
intercept vary independently.10 Specifically, I estimate:
yij = δ1αˆj + δ2ξˆj + τ1(10
th grade test score)ij
+ τ2(10
th grade school average test score)j +Xijφ+ Zjθ + µij (7)
Outcomes are 12th-grade test scores and dummy variables for high school gradua-
tion and college attendance. Both high school graduation and college attendance
are only observed until 1984 which corresponds to the second year of college for
a typical college matriculated student in this sample. X represents a vector of
characteristics relating to the student, Z a vector of school characteristics, and
the effects of grading standards are given by the coefficients δ1 and δ2 with the
differential effect given by δ2.
11
9In Betts and Grogger the model that is estimated is:
Aij =
nSCH∑
j=1
SCHOOLijαj +
nCOR∑
m=1
ρijmβm +GPAijγ + ij
10It is necessary to fix the intercept when looking at the effect of the slope. Without fixing
the intercept the slope coefficient would not necessarily be picking up the effect of differentially
higher grading standards. To see this, consider school A with an estimated intercept, αˆA, of 14
and an estimated slope, ξˆA, of 2. Now, consider a school B with a smaller intercept but a bigger
slope, in this example let αˆB = 2 and ξˆB = 8. Then, on the math GPA range from [0, 2) which
is an average GPA of an “F” to a “C”, school A has higher grading standards as the average
achievement necessary from a student at school A to get the same GPA as a student at school
B is higher than that from a student at school B. However, this relationship reverses from a
GPA between a “C” and an “A” with a student at school B with an average GPA in this range
facing higher grading standards than a student at school A. If this example were to occur in the
data and δ1 were left out of equation (7) then δ2 would be picking up the mixed effect of having
higher and lower standards across the grade distribution.
11To show the stability of the coefficients across covariate, X and Z vary in different specifi-
cations. For details behind each specification see Appendix B.
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C The assumptions concerning the analysis in this paper
With the absence of a natural experiment or a true measure of student achievement
this study relies on a number of assumptions to identify the effect of grading
standards on student outcomes. The most basic assumption is that the 12th grade
standardized math test is a meaningful and objective measure of math achievement.
In Betts and Grogger they conclude that the test does not appear to be racially
biased. I perform a similar test for a gender biased exam and my results are
consistent in that specification as well as the one shown.
Another strong assumption is that math courses of a similar name are similar
across schools. In comparing a resource rich school to a deprived school we can
expect that this will not be true with courses being of higher quality at the resource
rich school. The implication is that the higher quality school may incorrectly be
assigned a higher grading standard. To reduce the impact this would have on
outcomes I include a number of school quality controls in the outcome equation.
When evaluating the impact of grading standards it would be ideal to have
student achievement measures prior to any exposure to the grading standards.
Unfortunately I do not see students before they enter high school - the first ob-
servation occurring in the student’s sophomore year. It is possible that some of
the impact of grading standards occurs in the first year of high school. To the
extent the impact of grading standards is uniformly positive this will result in my
estimates understating the true effect of grading standards.
Furthermore, the analysis requires that my controls for school achievement
are sufficient to avoid the possibility that the distribution of student achievement
causes grading standards. I have found strong evidence that schools do to a large
extent tailor grading standards to the within school achievement distribution. To
9
account for this tendency to grade on a curve I include a control for the mean of
the school 10th grade test score distribution.12
Finally, as I am unable to see the same student under two different and random
grading standard regimes it is necessary to make some assumptions about how a
student’s grading standards are determined. It is possible that students who would
have been adversely impacted by high grading standards knew this before enrolling
in a public high school and so enrolled in private school or a different public high
school. This shifting of students could occur in both directions with those best
impacted by high grading standards shifting to those type schools and those best
impacted by low standards also shifting. The opportunity to transfer schools for
the benefit of the student will be more possible for the resource rich student and
since high grading standards are correlated with family income this net bias is
likely to inflate the effect we would unconditionally observe.
To try to account for this potential bias I include an extensive list of family
controls and lagged student achievement. For identification I assume that the 10th
grade math test score serves as a good proxy for prior math achievement before
entering high school and that after conditioning on family covariates, prior math
achievement is all that affects the student’s eventual placement at a particular
school.
D How missing observations were handled
Some of the key variables have missing information and to the extent that the miss-
ing information is not random my results may be biased. Transcript information
is missing for 664 students that are attached to a constructed grading standard.
12I also run specifications that include a measure of skewness, an indicator for negative skew-
ness, and a count for the number of students within a school with a 10th grade math score above
the 75th percentile of such scores. For all specifications, the results are similar to those shown in
this paper.
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This missingness is positively correlated with grading standards and a comparison
of means shows that these missing students have lower average test scores and
lower test score gains. Since they are included in the second stage regression this
could result in a downward bias of the effect of grading standards on achievement
if their presence in the construction of grading standards would have reduced those
variables. To the extent that is possible I also compute regressions where these
students are included in the equation constructing grading standards and are as-
signed a math GPA within one standard deviation above their 12th grade test score
which will mechanically lower their school’s grading standard. Results are similar.
The problem of a missing 12th grade test score for 1,180 students in my sample
is handled differently. Since it is difficult to find a valid instrument for a selection
equation in the HSB data I follow Betts and Grogger in first determining the stu-
dent’s percentile rank in the 10th grade test distribution. I then assign the student
a 12th grade test score within decile from the 12th grade test score distribution.
This method requires the student have a 10th grade test score from which 351 stu-
dents do not.13 These students with imputed 12th grade test scores are excluded
from the calculation of grading standards but included in outcome regressions.
Another source of missing observations involves students that transfer schools.
When looking at outcomes it is plausible that the grading standards caused the
538 students that transferred schools to do so because of poor performance at the
original school. These students are linked to the school they attended before the
transfer. In what I believe to be a conservative approach I first determine the
student’s percentile rank in the 10th grade test score distribution. I then assign
the student a 12th grade test score within decile from the 12th grade test score
13Following the assumption that missingness is random I have also run models where I assign
any student missing a 12th grade test score the mean 12th grade grade test score which allows for
including the entire 1,180 students with missing 12th grade test scores and my results are similar.
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distribution. This method assumes that if these students had not transferred they
would have had no improvement in the 12th grade test score distribution.14
III Results
Using the fixed effects and the fixed effects interactions as grading standards in
a second stage equation presents a number of econometric issues. First, since the
grading standards are estimates they are subject to sampling variation that will
enter the second stage. Standard errors that do not account for this variation will
be smaller than corrected standard errors if the disturbances are uncorrelated but
with correlation the direction is ambiguous (Murphy and Topel, 2002).
Second, the estimation method requires that certain estimators in the second
stage not be included in the first stage. Therefore, covariates in the second stage
may be correlated with the residuals from the first stage which will enter through
the grading standards variables (Cardell and Hopkins, 1977).
Furthermore, asymptotic results are based on limits as the number of students
gets large. However, as we increase the number of students we must undoubtedly
also increase the number of schools. Then, it becomes difficult to form a consistent
estimate of the school coefficients as their estimate will depend on still unknown
other parameters (Neyman and Scott, 1948).
All standard errors and statistical tests are given with assumptions that the
sampling distribution constructed from sampling the data provides a good approx-
imation to the true sampling variation. With an additional assumption that the
14The imputation methods resulted in little change over simply dropping students that trans-
ferred high schools or that had a missing 12th grade test score. Results with imputed test scores
show smaller (though not statistically different) effect sizes for the differential and absolute coef-
ficients from the slope and intercept model (which will be described in Section B). Results from
dropping either those with a missing 12th grade test score or those that transferred schools can
be seen in Table 18 on page 47 for 12th grade test score as an outcome and in Table 19 on page 48
for the outcomes of high school graduation and college attendance.
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student unobservables are correlated within schools I present bootstrapped stan-
dard errors with respect to school clusters of 1,000 repetitions from regressions
estimated using OLS.
A Outcome: 12th grade test scores
Overall
Table 1 on page 15 displays estimates of the effect of grading standards on 12th
grade test scores. Panel A presents my replication of the model from Betts and
Grogger and panel B displays results from the slope and intercept model. In both
models, the grading standard constructed from school-specific intercepts is labeled
as the “absolute” effect and the grading standard constructed from the slope as
the “differential” effect. All variables shown including the outcome variable, 12th
grade test scores, have been centered at zero with standard deviation one.
Columns (1) through (5) show how the grading standard estimates are stable in
response to an increasingly saturated regression model. It is necessary to condition
on either the student’s 10th grade test score or the student’s school’s mean 10th
grade test score since achievement distributions cause grading practices to some
extent. In all regressions shown I include both.
By comparing across columns you will notice that once I condition on the
lags the coefficients appear orthogonal to school level controls which include the
percent of student’s that drop out and an indicator for urban; threats to learning
controls which contain indicators for the severity of problems such as student’s
cutting class and robbery and theft on campus; student demographic controls
which include occupational dummies and family income; and to census division
dummies. χ2 statistics are reported from a Wald test that uses the inverse of the
cluster, bootstrap covariance matrix when testing whether the additional covariates
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shown in the column are significantly different than zero.15 For all groups of
controls except the census division dummies the additional controls are shown to
matter for both models in determining 12th grade test score.
Looking first at Panel A which displays the replication of the Betts and Grogger
results my estimated coefficients are slightly larger than those reported in Betts
and Grogger with a one standard deviation increase in absolute grading standards
resulting in a 0.1030 standard deviation increase in 12th grade test scores (com-
pared to 0.068 as shown in their paper). I am unable to explain this difference.
However, since my replication follows only the guide in the text it is possible that
we differed in our measures of the 12th grade test score, imputation methods, and
course variable constructions. Since both paper’s results depend on a conditional
independence assumption these differences in method could cause our results to
differ due to insufficient controls or measurement error in either paper.
Turning now to Panel B, column (5) the estimated absolute effect of grading
standards is larger than in the intercept only model. The differential effect is also
strong and significant. Standard errors are reported with the bootstrap method
sampling on school clusters. Bootstrapping the standard errors results in only
modest increases in the standard errors of the slope and intercept model as com-
pared to a cluster calculation (less than 5% change for the results shown in column
5); however, the effect of bootstrapping is more substantial in the intercept only
model which present standard errors approximately 70% smaller than those when
clustering alone is used.
Provided the controls are sufficient for validity of an independence of treatment
assumption Table 1 shows that differentially higher grading standards result in an
increase in average achievement. A school that has differentially higher grading
15This statistic is estimated using the variance weighted distance of a Wald but it lacks a
definable likelihood since unobservables are correlated within schools.
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standards of one standard deviation above the mean can be expected to have higher
achievement by 0.13 standard deviations than a school with average differential
grading standards.
Since the effect of grading standards will be driven by preferences, effort, and
ability; it is unlikely that the effect will be uniform across groups. The next
few sections present results for students at different quantiles of the achievement
distribution, also for students of different race and ethnicity, and for men and
women separately.
Table 1: Estimated effects of grading standards on 12th grade test scoresab
Grading Standard (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Intercept only model
Absolute effect 0·1079 0·1043 0·1058 0·1018 0·1030
(0·0095) (0·0092) (0·0033) (0·0091) (0·0027)
R2 0·67 0·67 0·67 0·70 0·70
Incrementalc χ2 42·?? 133·??? 900·??? 94·???
[20] [18] [82] [9]
B. Slope and intercept model
Absolute effect 0·1716 0·1631 0·1688 0·1616 0·1621
(0·0197) (0·0183) (0·0056) (0·0174) (0·0176)
Differential effect 0·1366 0·1291 0·1366 0·1280 0·1281
(0·0182) (0·0169) (0·0052) (0·0160) (0·0162)
R2 0·67 0·67 0·67 0·70 0·70
Incremental χ2 40·?? 78·??? 979·??? 8·
[20] [18] [82] [9]
Other controls (all regres-
sions in column):
Lags X X X X X
School variablesd X X X X
Threats to learning X X X
Student demographics X X
Census division dummies X
aFigures in parentheses are standard errors. Sample size is 8589.
bAll regressions include the student’s 10th -grade test score, the student’s school’s mean 10th
-grade test score, and a dummy indicating whether those variables are missing.
cχ2 statistics shown with degrees of freedom in brackets from a Wald test that the additional
covariates are jointly no different than zero († p<0.10, ? p<0.05, ?? p<0.01, ??? p<0.001).
dIncludes dummy variables for fraction of students black, fraction of students who drop
out, fraction of class taking remedial math, and miles between high school and four year col-
lege/university when missing.
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By quantile
I estimate quantile regressions with the same covariates used in column (5) of
Table 1 on the previous page at the 10th through the 90th quantiles of the 12th
grade test score distribution at increments of 1/20th .16 These results are shown
graphically in Figure 1 and again in Table 8 on page 34.
Figure 1 presents the grading standard coefficient estimates from the intercept
only model and the slope and intercept model with two standard error bands.
Focusing on the differential effect from the slope and intercept model we see that
the effect is strongest at the upper quantiles with the impact of the effect rising
linearly until around the 60th quantile, dipping to the 75th and then ascending
more rapidly through the 90th . The effect is largest at the 90th quantile with
predicted student gains of 95% more than students in the 10th quantile from a one
standard-deviation increase in differential grading standards. The absolute effect
from both models has similar patterns with the effect size at the lowest quantile
being nearly half that of the most upper. The median from each grading standard
is considerably lower than its corresponding mean indicating that the conditional
density is asymmetric or that outliers are partially contributing to the effect.17
16Standard errors are computed using the Koenker and Bassett method in this version of the
paper. Since I believe the assumption of a homoscedastic error distribution is violated this should
be viewed as an imperfect approximation. Bootstrap standard errors will substitute at some later
date.
17See Koenker and Hallock (2001) for this discussion.
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Figure 1: Coefficient estimates from quantile regressions ranging from the 10th to
the 90th quantiles in steps of 1/20th with two standard error bands
By gender
A number of studies have concluded that women respond differently to competition
with any benefit received from competition being less than that for men.18 An in-
crease in absolute or differential grading standards could result in more peer-group
competition should grading standards result in fewer desirable grade opportunities.
In Table 2 on page 19 I split the sample by gender with female results appearing
in panels I and male results appearing in panels II. Student demographic variables
no longer contain the student’s gender. Models were also considered that included
the fraction of females per school and results were similar to those shown with the
fraction shown to not matter.
18See, e.g., Gneezy et al. (2003); Gneezy and Rustichini (2004); Niederle and Vesterlund (2007);
and Price (2008).
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In each model and for both grading standards considered the effects are largest
for males; however, the difference is only statistically significant for the intercept
only model given the more imprecise estimates that come from the intercept and
slope model. Looking at the column (5) specification from the intercept only
model, men stand to gain 40% more than women from a one standard deviation
increase in absolute grading standards. The estimated gains for men relative to
women from the slope and intercept model is 26% and 21% for the absolute and
the differential effects, respectively.
Grading standard parameter estimates by each quantile of the 12th grade test
score distribution are presented separately for women and men in Figure 2 and
again in Table 9 on page 35 and Table 10 on page 36. The effect is gradually
increasing across the achievement distribution for women with a slight but in-
significant dip and gain occurring at the 65th percentile of the female test score
distribution. For men the effect is fairly constant across quantile until around the
70th quantile where the effect size rises sharply for men with a relative change from
the 70th to the 90th quantile of 58%, 66%, and 107% for the absolute effect in the
intercept only model, and the absolute, differential effects from the slope and in-
tercept model, respectively. This large gain in the upper tail results in 90/10 ratios
of 1.53, 1.86, and 2.39 for the absolute effect in the intercept only model and the
absolute and differential effects from the slope and intercept model, respectively.
However, the median compared to the bottom quantile presents a very different
story with 50/10 ratios of .89, .98, and 1.11, respectively.
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Table 2: Estimated effects of grading standards on 12th grade test scores by gen-
derab
Grading Standard (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Intercept only model
I. Female
Absolute effect 0·0961 0·0928 0·0948 0·0837 0·0854
(0·0123) (0·0126) (0·0042) (0·0123) (0·0050)
II. Male
Absolute effect 0·1190 0·1153 0·1166 0·1191 0·1197
(0·0125) (0·0119) (0·0042) (0·0119) (0·0042)
B. Slope and intercept model
I. Female
Absolute effect 0·1603 0·1533 0·1586 0·1412 0·1429
(0·0230) (0·0222) (0·0227) (0·0221) (0·0222)
Differential effect 0·1306 0·1258 0·1337 0·1143 0·1152
(0·0214) (0·0215) (0·0211) (0·0209) (0·0205)
II. Male
Absolute effect 0·1809 0·1708 0·1774 0·1796 0·1794
(0·0242) (0·0241) (0·0091) (0·0228) (0·0235)
Differential effect 0·1417 0·1323 0·1391 0·1399 0·1395
(0·0230) (0·0225) (0·0089) (0·0218) (0·0227)
Other controls (all regres-
sions in column):
Lags X X X X X
School variablesc X X X X
Threats to learning X X X
Student demographics X X
Census division dummies X
aFigures in parentheses are standard errors. Sample size is 4277 for panels I and 4312 for
panels II.
bAll regressions include the student’s 10th -grade test score, the student’s school’s mean 10th
-grade test score, and a dummy indicating whether those variables are missing.
cIncludes dummy variables for fraction of students black, fraction of students who drop
out, fraction of class taking remedial math, and miles between high school and four year col-
lege/university when missing.
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Figure 2: Coefficient estimates from quantile regressions ranging from the 10th to
the 90th quantiles in steps of 1/20th with two standard error bands by
gender
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By race/ethnicity
I present results for Hispanic, black, and white separately in Table 3 on the follow-
ing page for the intercept only model shown in panel A and the slope and intercept
model shown in panel B. In both models the effect is strongest for blacks with the
smallest effect being shared by whites and Hispanics. Student demographics vari-
ables exclude race/ethnicity.19
Focusing on the differential effect from column (5) Table 3 on the next page
shows that black students have predicted gains in average test scores of 1/5 of
a standard deviation from a one standard deviation change in grading standards
which is approximately twice the effect for Hispanic students and a little more than
one and a half that of white students. The absolute grading standard for blacks
relative to Hispanics varies across the models being 38% larger in the intercept
only model and 68% larger in the slope and intercept model. The relative differ-
ence is similar for both models when comparing black students to white students
with black students gaining approximately 60% more than white students in both
specifications.
19The effect for blacks is in stark contrast to the effect noted by Betts and Grogger where it
was noted that the effect was smallest for blacks in comparison to whites and Hispanics. This
difference in effect is present when I restrict the sample to those without imputed test scores, to
those that did not transfer high schools, and when I restrict the analysis to the core covariates
used in the Betts and Grogger paper of lags, school variables, and student demographics.
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Table 3: Estimated effects of grading standards on 12th grade test scores by raceab
Grading Standard (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Intercept only model
I. Hispanic only
Absolute effect 0·1183 0·1157 0·1200 0·1052 0·1151
(0·0183) (0·0115) (0·0195) (0·0040) (0·0030)
II. Black only
Absolute effect 0·1179 0·1482 0·1579 0·1490 0·1594
(0·0286) (0·0291) (0·0114) (0·0248) (0·0309)
III. White only
Absolute effect 0·0956 0·0912 0·0923 0·0994 0·0996
(0·0114) (0·0115) (0·0038) (0·0113) (0·0118)
B. Slope and intercept model
I. Hispanic only
Absolute effect 0·1689 0·1675 0·1772 0·1511 0·1546
(0·0336) (0·0344) (0·0204) (0·0205) (0·0216)
Differential effect 0·1111 0·1115 0·1281 0·1032 0·1050
(0·0306) (0·0294) (0·0178) (0·0182) (0·0192)
II. Black only
Absolute effect 0·2136 0·2519 0·2658 0·2535 0·2607
(0·0455) (0·0476) (0·0417) (0·0479) (0·0477)
Differential effect 0·1655 0·1870 0·2073 0·1903 0·2045
(0·0424) (0·0434) (0·0394) (0·0456) (0·0430)
III. White only
Absolute effect 0·1575 0·1469 0·1513 0·1604 0·1615
(0·0199) (0·0206) (0·0089) (0·0062) (0·0204)
Differential effect 0·1298 0·1201 0·1241 0·1300 0·1312
(0·0191) (0·0197) (0·0086) (0·0063) (0·0197)
Other controls (all regres-
sions in column):
Lags X X X X X
School variablesc X X X X
Threats to learning X X X
Student demographics X X
Census division dummies X
aFigures in parentheses are standard errors. Sample size is 1809 for panels I, 1061 for panels
II, and 5244 for panels III.
bAll regressions include the student’s 10th -grade test score, the student’s school’s mean 10th
-grade test score, and a dummy indicating whether those variables are missing.
cIncludes dummy variables for fraction of students black, fraction of students who drop
out, fraction of class taking remedial math, and miles between high school and four year col-
lege/university when missing.
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B Outcome: High school graduation and
college attendance by 1984
Overall
In Table 4 on the following page I look at the effect of grading standards on high
school graduation and in Table 5 on page 25 I look at the effect of grading standards
on college attendance at a four year college or university with linear probability
models. A student is calculated as having graduated high school if by 1984 the
student has received a diploma and not a GED. A student is calculated as having
attended college if by 1984 the student has earned some positive amount of credit
hours at a four year college or university.
The effect is insignificant for both outcomes, both models and grading standards
considered. Betts and Grogger have similar findings and suggest that this may be
a result of the largest effect of grading standards occurring at upper quantiles of
the test score distribution where students are more likely to graduate high school
and go to college anyway. Despite modest gains at the lower quantiles of the test
score distribution the gains may not be enough to induce a change in preferences
or a relative decrease in outside options which could be why these quantiles do not
contribute to an overall positive effect. It could also be that the effect is mixed for
these groups with some students becoming discouraged by higher grading standards
and dropping out or not attending college while causing others to earn a degree
or attend college with the effects on these different groups netting out. Of course,
these results are conditional on education decisions being made by 1984 so I cannot
identify any effect of grading standards that might postpone education decisions
beyond 1984.
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Table 4: Estimated effects of grading standards on high school graduationab
Grading Standard (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Intercept only model
Absolute effect −0·0013 −0·0006 0·0004 0·0040 0·0037
(0·0052) (0·0053) (0·0017) (0·0044) (0·0017)
R2 0·06 0·07 0·07 0·26 0·27
Incrementalc χ2 43·?? 290·??? 1575·??? 105·???
[20] [18] [82] [9]
B. Slope and intercept model
Absolute effect 0·0042 0·0039 0·0079 0·0107 0·0107
(0·0098) (0·0100) (0·0031) (0·0082) (0·0082)
Differential effect 0·0104 0·0107 0·0158 0·0134 0·0126
(0·0106) (0·0110) (0·0036) (0·0093) (0·0091)
R2 0·06 0·07 0·07 0·26 0·27
Incremental χ2 41·?? 274·??? 1447·??? 20·?
[20] [18] [82] [9]
Other controls (all regres-
sions in column):
Lags X X X X X
School variablesd X X X X
Threats to learning X X X
Student demographics X X
Census division dummies X
aFigures in parentheses are standard errors. Sample size is 8679.
bAll regressions include the student’s 10th -grade test score, the student’s school’s mean 10th
-grade test score, and a dummy indicating whether those variables are missing.
cχ2 statistics shown with degrees of freedom in brackets from a Wald test that the additional
covariates are jointly no different than zero († p<0.10, ? p<0.05, ?? p<0.01, ??? p<0.001).
dIncludes dummy variables for fraction of students black, fraction of students who drop
out, fraction of class taking remedial math, and miles between high school and four year col-
lege/university when missing.
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Table 5: Estimated effects of grading standards on college attendance by 1984ab
Grading Standard (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Intercept only model
Absolute effect −0·0122 −0·0091 −0·0073 −0·0065 −0·0016
(0·0087) (0·0078) (0·0028) (0·0072) (0·0030)
R2 0·16 0·17 0·18 0·26 0·27
Incrementalc χ2 66·??? 327·??? 1353·??? 528·???
[20] [18] [82] [9]
B. Slope and intercept model
Absolute effect −0·0215 −0·0201 −·0160 −0·0141 −0·0075
(0·0134) (0·0135) (0·0044) (0·0121) (0·0119)
Differential effect −0·0122 −0·0106 −0·0069 −0·0087 −0·0029
(0·0129) (0·0127) (0·0044) (0·0117) (0·0115)
R2 0·16 0·17 0·18 0·26 0·27
Incremental χ2 68·??? 195·??? 1251·??? 67·???
[20] [18] [82] [9]
Other controls (all regres-
sions in column):
Lags X X X X X
School variablesd X X X X
Threats to learning X X X
Student demographics X X
Census division dummies X
aFigures in parentheses are standard errors. Sample size is 8305.
bAll regressions include the student’s 10th -grade test score, the student’s school’s mean 10th
-grade test score, and a dummy indicating whether those variables are missing.
cχ2 statistics shown with degrees of freedom in brackets from a Wald test that the additional
covariates are jointly no different than zero († p<0.10, ? p<0.05, ?? p<0.01, ??? p<0.001).
dIncludes dummy variables for fraction of students black, fraction of students who drop
out, fraction of class taking remedial math, and miles between high school and four year col-
lege/university when missing.
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By race/ethnicity
In Table 6 on the following page I show estimates of the effect of grading standards
on high school graduation by race/ethnicity, again with linear probability models.
For each model I do not find an effect of grading standards on graduation. This is
in contrast to that observed by Betts and Grogger where they uncovered negative
effects for blacks and Hispanics. While the coefficient on the absolute grading
standard for the black only models is consistently negative across specification the
size of the effect is very small with large standard errors, so large that I cannot with
any reasonable uncertainty say that the effect is negative. I also estimate separate
models by race/ethnicity for college attendance by 1984 which can be seen in
Table 7 on page 28. Similarly, I see no effect which is a conclusion consistent with
that reached by Betts and Grogger.
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Table 6: Estimated effects of grading standards on high school graduation by raceab
Grading Standard (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Intercept only model
I. Hispanic only
Absolute effect 0·0127 0·0140 0·0143 0·0082 0·0046
(0·0115) (0·0119) (0·0074) (0·0072) (0·0022)
II. Black only
Absolute effect −0·0087 −0·0068 −0·0032 −0·0055 −0·0147
(0·0142) (0·0156) (0·0075) (0·0141) (0·0190)
III. White only
Absolute effect −0·0002 −0·0011 −0·0001 0·0065 0·0068
(0·0063) (0·0067) (0·0029) (0·0021) (0·0062)
B. Slope and intercept model
I. Hispanic only
Absolute effect 0·0184 0·0190 0·0221 0·0047 −0·0019
(0·0188) (0·0195) (0·0067) (0·0071) (0·0062)
Differential effect 0·0117 0·0148 0·0221 −0·0027 −0·0094
(0·0184) (0·0183) (0·0066) (0·0067) (0·0061)
II. Black only
Absolute effect −0·0208 −0·0156 −0·0048 −0·0150 −0·0257
(0·0254) (0·0280) (0·0239) (0·0276) (0·0175)
Differential effect 0·0065 0·0161 0·0249 0·0203 0·0100
(0·0244) (0·0246) (0·0199) (0·0246) (0·0161)
III. White only
Absolute effect 0·0098 0·0059 0·0087 0·0183 0·0188
(0·0125) (0·0141) (0·0136) (0·0055) (0·0044)
Differential effect 0·0175 0·0150 0·0186 0·0223 0·0223
(0·0139) (0·0159) (0·0152) (0·0061) (0·0050)
Other controls (all regres-
sions in column):
Lags X X X X X
School variablesc X X X X
Threats to learning X X X
Student demographics X X
Census division dummies X
aFigures in parentheses are standard errors. Sample size is 1836 for panels I, 1095 for panels
II, and 5273 for panels III.
bAll regressions include the student’s 10th -grade test score, the student’s school’s mean 10th
-grade test score, and a dummy indicating whether those variables are missing.
cIncludes dummy variables for fraction of students black, fraction of students who drop
out, fraction of class taking remedial math, and miles between high school and four year col-
lege/university when missing.
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Table 7: Estimated effects of grading standards on college attendance by 1984 by
raceab
Grading Standard (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Intercept only model
I. Hispanic only
Absolute effect 0·0080 0·0121 0·0157 0·0119 0·0172
(0·0123) (0·0115) (0·0074) (0·0122) (0·0027)
II. Black only
Absolute effect −0·0337 −0·0250 −0·0196 −0·0269 −0·0111
(0·0211) (0·0210) (0·0160) (0·0215) (0·0105)
III. White only
Absolute effect −0·0075 −0·0119 −0·0104 −0·0013 0·0031
(0·0094) (0·0097) (0·0036) (0·0031) (0·0091)
B. Slope and intercept model
I. Hispanic only
Absolute effect 0·0078 0·0054 0·0133 0·0069 0·0103
(0·0197) (0·0202) (0·0067) (0·0069) (0·0082)
Differential effect 0·0043 0·0085 0·0159 0·0073 0·0105
(0·0189) (0·0177) (0·0066) (0·0063) (0·0077)
II. Black only
Absolute effect −0·0420 −0·0226 −0·0156 −0·0300 −0·0117
(0·0374) (0·0368) (0·0084) (0·0373) (0·0366)
Differential effect −0·0458 −0·0388 −0·0248 −0·0466 −0·0229
(0·0321) (0·0330) (0·0081) (0·0346) (0·0343)
III. White only
Absolute effect −0·0141 −0·0224 −0·0203 −0·0056 0·0008
(0·0161) (0·0167) (0·0168) (0·0153) (0·0144)
Differential effect −0·0008 −0·0084 −0·0066 0·0066 0·0109
(0·0161) (0·0167) (0·0164) (0·0153) (0·0143)
Other controls (all regres-
sions in column):
Lags X X X X X
School variablesc X X X X
Threats to learning X X X
Student demographics X X
Census division dummies X
aFigures in parentheses are standard errors. Sample size is 1746 for panels I, 1024 for panels
II, and 5086 for panels III.
bAll regressions include the student’s 10th -grade test score, the student’s school’s mean 10th
-grade test score, and a dummy indicating whether those variables are missing.
cIncludes dummy variables for fraction of students black, fraction of students who drop
out, fraction of class taking remedial math, and miles between high school and four year col-
lege/university when missing.
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IV Conclusion
This paper has shown that incorporating a continuum of grading standards rather
than a single, absolute standard can raise (lower) average achievement when the
grading standards increase (decrease) across the math GPA distribution. That is,
demanding more achievement from students that wish to go from an A- to an A
than students that would like to earn a C rather than a C- can lead to greater
average test scores overall. The effect of grading standards on 12th grade test
scores is greatest at the top of the achievement distribution, larger for men than
women and larger for blacks than whites and Hispanics. No effect from grading
standards on high school graduation or college attendance two years post expected
high school graduation has been found.
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APPENDIX
A Details on grading standard estimation (equation (6))
How math GPA is computed (GPAij)
Full high school transcripts were provided for a probability sample from the sopho-
more cohort that participated in the 1982 survey. Using the course name I identify
math courses and compute a math specific GPA for each student using the school
specific coding shown in Figure 3 on the following page after assigning letter grades
the appropriate GPA on a 4.33 scale with an F earning a zero, D- a 0.7, and an A+
a 4.33. A fail (Figure 3 #15) is given a value of zero while pass, incomplete, satis-
factory, unsatisfactory, withdraw or audit (Figure 3 #14, 16, 17, 18) are not used
in either computing the GPA or the count of courses completed by the student.
Students are given credit for the highest grade received per course.
To give courses the proper credit toward a GPA, quarter course credits count
1/4 toward a GPA, semester credits 1/2, and trimester 1/3. If a student retakes a
course the highest grade counts toward the GPA.
How course activity was computed (ρijm)
From the transcript data courses were put into categories of similar names such
as “Algebra I” or “Introduction to Algebra” and these categories were represented
independently in equation (6). If a student fails the course with no successful
retake no credit in course count is given to the student. If a student received a
grade greater than zero that counted toward a math GPA as described above then
the course counted toward the student’s total for that category of courses. The
ideal would be to compare students with precisely the same courses but that is not
possible in this data.
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GRADES 
If failure is If failure is If failure is 
:ode Below 60 Below 65 Below 70 
1 98-100 A+ 98-100 A+ 99-100 A+ 
2 93-97 A 95-97 A 96-98 A 
3 90-92 A- 92-94 A- 94-95 A- 
4 87-89 B+ 89-91 B+ 92-93 B+ 
5 83-86 B 86-88 B 88-91 B 
6 80-82 B- 83-85 B- 86-87 B- 
7 77-79 c+ 80-82 C+ 84-85 C+ 
8 73-76 C 77-79 c 80-83 C 
9 70-72 C- 74-76 C- 78-79 C- 
10 67-69 'D+ 71-73 D+ 76-77 D+ 
11 63-66 D 68-70 D 72-75 D 
12 60-62 D- 65-67 D- 70-71 D- 
13 Below 60 - F Below 65 * F Below 70 = F 
14 Pass - for a course graded on a pass-fail basis; or 
Satisfactory - for a course graded on a satisfactory- 
unsatisfactory basis 
15 Fail - for a course graded on a pass-fail basis; or 
Unsatisfactory - for a course graded on a satisfactory- 
unsatisfactory basis 
16 Incomplete 
-17 Withdraw 
18 Audit or Registered 
Figure 3: Detail on how course grades are represented in the survey. Reprinted
from “High School and Beyond Transcripts Survey”, NORC, 1983
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B Details on outcome equations (equation (7))
Many of the tables display five specifications that increasingly add covariates to
show the sensitivity of grading standards to additional controls. For such tables
all specifications shown include lags; four include lags and school variables; three
include lags, school variables, and threats to learning; etc. The details of these
control variables follow:
Lags: 10th grade standardized test score, Student’s school’s mean
10th grade standardized test score, and indicator variables for
when those values are missing.
School variables: Indicator for urban, percent of students that are black, per-
cent of students that drop out, miles from a four year college
or university, percent of students taking remedial math, and
dummy variables representing the 10 quantiles of high school
spending per pupil.
Threats to learn-
ing:
Dummy variables of “minor or never”, “serious or moderate”
or whether the principal did not respond to the question “To
what degree is each of these matters a problem in your high
school?” for the following:
1. student absenteeism
2. students cutting class
3. teacher absenteeism
4. teachers lack commitment or motivation
5. robbery or theft
6. student use of drugs or alcohol
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Student demo-
graphics:
gender, race dummies, two-parent family indicator and in-
dicator when missing, parent’s highest education level dum-
mies, yearly family income in 8ths dummies (top coded at
50K in 1980 $’s), number of siblings dummies, father’s occu-
pation dummies, mother’s occupation dummies, number of
older siblings dummies.
Census division
dummies:
Census division dummies.
C Quantile regression estimates
The following three tables list the coefficients and standard errors that are shown
visually in Figure 1 on page 17 and Figure 2 on page 20.
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Table 8: Quantile regression estimates of the effect of grading standards on 12th
grade test scoresab
Intercept only model Slope and intercept model
Absolute Absolute Differential
OLS
Mean 0·1030 0·1621 0·1281
(0·0027) (0·0176) (0·0162)
Quantile
10 0·0799 0·1136 0·0808
(0·0120) (0·0226) (0·0231)
15 0·0785 0·1239 0·0914
(0·0093) (0·0181) (0·0187)
20 0·0766 0·1238 0·0967
(0·0106) (0·0191) (0·0196)
25 0·0721 0·1106 0·0848
(0·0081) (0·0136) (0·0138)
30 0·0763 0·1214 0·0930
(0·0088) (0·0141) (0·0142)
35 0·0786 0·1230 0·0950
(0·0092) (0·0139) (0·0140)
40 0·0801 0·1246 0·0964
(0·0111) (0·0146) (0·0147)
45 0·0815 0·1307 0·1011
(0·0091) (0·0159) (0·0158)
50 0·0866 0·1322 0·1004
(0·0076) (0·0155) (0·0154)
55 0·0897 0·1366 0·1036
(0·0101) (0·0146) (0·0144)
60 0·0953 0·1485 0·1145
(0·0088) (0·0186) (0·0183)
65 0·0935 0·1448 0·1073
(0·0084) (0·0136) (0·0133)
70 0·0832 0·1306 0·0969
(0·0096) (0·0156) (0·0152)
75 0·0901 0·1314 0·0960
(0·0121) (0·0228) (0·0222)
80 0·0945 0·1503 0·1198
(0·0112) (0·0166) (0·0160)
85 0·1013 0·1616 0·1376
(0·0106) (0·0198) (0·0190)
90 0·1232 0·1819 0·1574
(0·0121) (0·0200) (0·0187)
aFigures in parentheses are standard errors.
bAll regressions include lags, school variables, threats to learning, student demographic, and
census division dummy controls. For details on these controls see Appendix B.
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Table 9: Quantile regression estimates of the effect of grading standards on 12th
grade test scores for womenab
Intercept only model Slope and intercept model
Absolute Absolute Differential
OLS
Mean 0·0854 0·1429 0·1152
(0·0050) (0·0222) (0·0205)
Quantile
10 0·0548 0·0914 0·0720
(0·0139) (0·0238) (0·0240)
15 0·0574 0·1042 0·0710
(0·0076) (0·0251) (0·0258)
20 0·0598 0·1234 0·0900
(0·0080) (0·0299) (0·0305)
25 0·0543 0·1205 0·0867
(0·0176) (0·0269) (0·0274)
30 0·0652 0·1124 0·0754
(0·0112) (0·0260) (0·0264)
35 0·0690 0·1237 0·0931
(0·0178) (0·0254) (0·0256)
40 0·0738 0·1235 0·0981
(0·0138) (0·0219) (0·0220)
45 0·0777 0·1356 0·1088
(0·0123) (0·0284) (0·0284)
50 0·0800 0·1474 0·1206
(0·0093) (0·0235) (0·0234)
55 0·0884 0·1418 0·1155
(0·0120) (0·0236) (0·0234)
60 0·0910 0·1470 0·1192
(0·0145) (0·0255) (0·0252)
65 0·0861 0·1507 0·1223
(0·0257) (0·0318) (0·0311)
70 0·0695 0·1148 0·0956
(0·0088) (0·0261) (0·0254)
75 0·0688 0·1086 0·0895
(0·0131) (0·0283) (0·0273)
80 0·0780 0·1275 0·0974
(0·0126) (0·0247) (0·0237)
85 0·0963 0·1431 0·1201
(0·0175) (0·0234) (0·0220)
90 0·1027 0·1496 0·1420
(0·0181) (0·0349) (0·0327)
aFigures in parentheses are standard errors.
bAll regressions include lags, school variables, threats to learning, student demographic, and
census division dummy controls. For details on these controls see Appendix B.
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Table 10: Quantile regression estimates of the effect of grading standards on 12th
grade test scores for menab
Intercept only model Slope and intercept model
Absolute Absolute Differential
OLS
Mean 0·1197 0·1794 0·1395
(0·0042) (0·0235) (0·0227)
Quantile
10 0·0949 0·1288 0·0862
(0·0194) (0·0430) (0·0440)
15 0·0945 0·1237 0·0910
(0·0151) (0·0482) (0·0497)
20 0·0881 0·1099 0·0803
(0·0237) (0·0249) (0·0256)
25 0·0853 0·1172 0·0987
(0·0188) (0·0167) (0·0168)
30 0·0881 0·1220 0·1071
(0·0077) (0·0203) (0·0204)
35 0·0877 0·1253 0·0978
(0·0122) (0·0135) (0·0136)
40 0·0880 0·1209 0·0940
(0·0175) (0·0209) (0·0209)
45 0·0894 0·1249 0·1015
(0·0117) (0·0267) (0·0265)
50 0·0849 0·1272 0·0956
(0·0100) (0·0150) (0·0149)
55 0·0900 0·1317 0·0927
(0·0171) (0·0265) (0·0262)
60 0·0910 0·1334 0·0943
(0·0135) (0·0133) (0·0130)
65 0·0857 0·1354 0·0925
(0·0095) (0·0256) (0·0252)
70 0·0918 0·1438 0·0997
(0·0101) (0·0428) (0·0417)
75 0·1042 0·1551 0·1120
(0·0228) (0·0325) (0·0315)
80 0·1124 0·1640 0·1281
(0·0198) (0·0290) (0·0281)
85 0·1234 0·2025 0·1629
(0·0170) (0·0311) (0·0298)
90 0·1454 0·2397 0·2059
(0·0300) (0·0417) (0·0399)
aFigures in parentheses are standard errors.
bAll regressions include lags, school variables, threats to learning, student demographic, and
census division dummy controls. For details on these controls see Appendix B.
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D Semilog Results
I also consider a model that compares schools with different growth rates in grad-
ing standards across the GPA distribution to determine if grading standards con-
structed in this manner are similar to those shown in the main body of this paper.
The answer is to a large extent yes. To construct grading standard growth rates I
run a semilog model in the first stage. Specifically, at the reduced form, the first
stage equation at the population is:
ln aij = αj + βjgij + γcij + δXij + ij (8)
where the model is identical to equation (3) except I take the natural logarithm of
12th grade achievement. Consider students randomly assigned to schools 1, 2.
Ei∈j[ln ai1 − ln ai2|X, cij, α1 = α2] = (β1 − β2)g (9)
Then, if the boundary of the distribution does not depend on the distribution itself
and sufficient smoothness conditions exist:
Ei∈j[
∂ai1
∂g
ai1
−
∂ai2
∂g
ai2
|X, cij, α1 = α2] = β1 − β2 (10)
It follows that if β1 > β2 school 1 has proportionally higher standards than school
2 as the average growth in achievement necessary to receive a given grade at school
1 is greater than that at school 2 with the premium on achievement growing by a
factor of β1 − β2.
Results follow in Table 11 on page 39 through Table 17 on page 45. The
tables reproduce the results from the intercept only model in Panels A as shown in
Tables 1 on page 15 through 7 on page 28 for comparison purposes and show results
from this new model which I will refer to as the “Growth and intercept model”
in Panels B. Standard errors shown in Panels B of these tables are computed
via clustering at the school level without the use of the bootstrap method. As
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in the body of the text, coefficient estimates have been obtained from different
model specifications that become increasingly saturated. The controls used in
each regression are listed at the bottom of the table.
Looking first at Table 11, notice that both the absolute effect and the pro-
portional effect are stable across specification. In column (5) we see that a one
standard deviation increase in proportional standards results in a 1/10 of a stan-
dard deviation increase in average achievement. This is roughly the same effect as
estimated in Table 1 on page 15 from differential standards. In Table 12 on page 40
coefficients are estimated separately for men and for women. A similar difference
in effect is shown for men and women from this model as that obtained from
the slope and intercept model with men shown to have larger gains from higher
grading standards than women. Turning now to Table 13 on page 41, the growth
and intercept grading standard model estimates different effect relationships by
race than those obtained from the slope and intercept model. In the growth and
intercept model I estimate effect sizes similar in magnitude for black and white
students with a magnitude greater than that for Hispanics. This is in contrast to
the results obtained from both the intercept only model and the slope and inter-
cept model where it was found that the effect sizes were similar for whites and
Hispanics and smaller in magnitude than that for blacks. The remaining tables,
Tables 14 through 17, show no effect of proportional grading standards on high
school graduation or college attendance by 1984 which is a conclusion consistent
with the results shown in the main body of this paper.
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Table 11: Estimated effects of grading standards on 12th grade test scores-semilog
modelab
Grading Standard (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Intercept only model
Absolute effect 0·1079 0·1043 0·1058 0·1018 0·1030
(0·0095) (0·0092) (0·0033) (0·0091) (0·0027)
R2 0·67 0·67 0·67 0·70 0·70
Incrementalc χ2 42·?? 133·??? 900·??? 94·???
[20] [18] [82] [9]
B. Growth and intercept
model
Absolute effect 0·1432 0·1308 0·1399 0·1317 0·1301
(0·0200) (0·0188) (0·0193) (0·0185) (0·0194)
Proportional effect 0·1046 0·0926 0·1032 0·0926 0·0911
(0·0192) (0·0180) (0·0184) (0·0182) (0·0189)
R2 0·66 0·67 0·67 0·69 0·69
Incremental χ2 40·?? 54·??? 773·??? 5·
[20] [18] [82] [9]
Other controls (all regres-
sions in column):
Lags X X X X X
School variablesd X X X X
Threats to learning X X X
Student demographics X X
Census division dummies X
aFigures in parentheses are standard errors. Sample size is 8589.
bAll regressions include the student’s 10th -grade test score, the student’s school’s mean 10th
-grade test score, and a dummy indicating whether those variables are missing.
cχ2 statistics shown with degrees of freedom in brackets from a Wald test that the additional
covariates are jointly no different than zero († p<0.10, ? p<0.05, ?? p<0.01, ??? p<0.001).
dIncludes dummy variables for fraction of students black, fraction of students who drop
out, fraction of class taking remedial math, and miles between high school and four year col-
lege/university when missing.
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Table 12: Estimated effects of grading standards on 12th grade test scores by
gender-semilog modelab
Grading Standard (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Intercept only model
I. Female
Absolute effect 0·0961 0·0928 0·0948 0·0837 0·0854
(0·0123) (0·0126) (0·0042) (0·0123) (0·0050)
II. Male
Absolute effect 0·1190 0·1153 0·1166 0·1191 0·1197
(0·0125) (0·0119) (0·0042) (0·0119) (0·0042)
B. Growth and intercept
model
I. Female
Absolute effect 0·1304 0·1161 0·1230 0·1042 0·1024
(0·0226) (0·0221) (0·0226) (0·0209) (0·0217)
Proportional effect 0·1002 0·0880 0·0979 0·0786 0·0763
(0·0212) (0·0211) (0·0217) (0·0201) (0·0208)
II. Male
Absolute effect 0·1545 0·1433 0·1549 0·1558 0·1552
(0·0269) (0·0253) (0·0256) (0·0253) (0·0267)
Proportional effect 0·1091 0·0975 0·1084 0·1049 0·1049
(0·0253) (0·0236) (0·0238) (0·0245) (0·0258)
Other controls (all regres-
sions in column):
Lags X X X X X
School variablesc X X X X
Threats to learning X X X
Student demographics X X
Census division dummies X
aFigures in parentheses are standard errors. Sample size is 4277 for panels I and 4312 for
panels II.
bAll regressions include the student’s 10th -grade test score, the student’s school’s mean 10th
-grade test score, and a dummy indicating whether those variables are missing.
cIncludes dummy variables for fraction of students black, fraction of students who drop
out, fraction of class taking remedial math, and miles between high school and four year col-
lege/university when missing.
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Table 13: Estimated effects of grading standards on 12th grade test scores by race-
semilog modelab
Grading Standard (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Intercept only model
I. Hispanic only
Absolute effect 0·1183 0·1157 0·1200 0·1052 0·1151
(0·0183) (0·0115) (0·0195) (0·0040) (0·0030)
II. Black only
Absolute effect 0·1179 0·1482 0·1579 0·1490 0·1594
(0·0286) (0·0291) (0·0114) (0·0248) (0·0309)
III. White only
Absolute effect 0·0956 0·0912 0·0923 0·0994 0·0996
(0·0114) (0·0115) (0·0038) (0·0113) (0·0118)
B. Growth and intercept
model
I. Hispanic only
Absolute effect 0·1306 0·1230 0·1316 0·1076 0·1060
(0·0358) (0·0351) (0·0351) (0·0339) (0·0353)
Proportional effect 0·0859 0·0829 0·0960 0·0667 0·0652
(0·0295) (0·0275) (0·0276) (0·0273) (0·0280)
II. Black only
Absolute effect 0·1696 0·1734 0·1929 0·1634 0·1546
(0·0360) (0·0406) (0·0438) (0·0425) (0·0461)
Proportional effect 0·1163 0·1077 0·1268 0·1030 0·1011
(0·0324) (0·0352) (0·0408) (0·0366) (0·0395)
III. White only
Absolute effect 0·1394 0·1296 0·1376 0·1417 0·1402
(0·0216) (0·0219) (0·0221) (0·0214) (0·0221)
Proportional effect 0·1064 0·0949 0·1036 0·1049 0·1035
(0·0214) (0·0220) (0·0220) (0·0216) (0·0221)
Other controls (all regres-
sions in column):
Lags X X X X X
School variablesc X X X X
Threats to learning X X X
Student demographics X X
Census division dummies X
aFigures in parentheses are standard errors. Sample size is 1809 for panels I, 1061 for panels
II, and 5244 for panels III.
bAll regressions include the student’s 10th -grade test score, the student’s school’s mean 10th
-grade test score, and a dummy indicating whether those variables are missing.
cIncludes dummy variables for fraction of students black, fraction of students who drop
out, fraction of class taking remedial math, and miles between high school and four year col-
lege/university when missing.
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Table 14: Estimated effects of grading standards on high school graduation-semilog
modelab
Grading Standard (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Intercept only model
Absolute effect −0·0013 −0·0006 0·0004 0·0040 0·0037
(0·0052) (0·0053) (0·0017) (0·0044) (0·0017)
R2 0·06 0·07 0·07 0·26 0·27
Incrementalc χ2 43·?? 290·??? 1575·??? 105·???
[20] [18] [82] [9]
B. Growth and intercept
model
Absolute effect 0·0075 0·0058 0·0108 0·0082 0·0064
(0·0108) (0·0106) (0·0106) (0·0082) (0·0080)
Proportional effect 0·0095 0·0072 0·0132 0·0077 0·0054
(0·0111) (0·0110) (0·0110) (0·0088) (0·0083)
R2 0·06 0·06 0·07 0·26 0·26
Incremental χ2 45·?? 63·??? 1259·??? 21·?
[20] [18] [82] [9]
Other controls (all regres-
sions in column):
Lags X X X X X
School variablesd X X X X
Threats to learning X X X
Student demographics X X
Census division dummies X
aFigures in parentheses are standard errors. Sample size is 8679.
bAll regressions include the student’s 10th -grade test score, the student’s school’s mean 10th
-grade test score, and a dummy indicating whether those variables are missing.
cχ2 statistics shown with degrees of freedom in brackets from a Wald test that the additional
covariates are jointly no different than zero († p<0.10, ? p<0.05, ?? p<0.01, ??? p<0.001).
dIncludes dummy variables for fraction of students black, fraction of students who drop
out, fraction of class taking remedial math, and miles between high school and four year col-
lege/university when missing.
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Table 15: Estimated effects of grading standards on college attendance by 1984-
semilog modelab
Grading Standard (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Intercept only model
Absolute effect −0·0122 −0·0091 −0·0073 −0·0065 −0·0016
(0·0085) (0·0077) (0·0077) (0·0073) (0·0072)
R2 0·16 0·17 0·18 0·26 0·27
Incrementalc χ2 70·??? 46·??? 1158·??? 77·???
[20] [18] [82] [9]
B. Slope and intercept model
Absolute effect −0·0183 −0·0179 −0·0131 −0·0109 −0·0046
(0·0129) (0·0126) (0·0126) (0·0120) (0·0114)
Proportional effect −0·0152 −0·0164 −0·0116 −0·0121 −0·0066
(0·0122) (0·0118) (0·0119) (0·0115) (0·0107)
R2 0·16 0·17 0·17 0·26 0·27
Incremental χ2 62·??? 46·??? 1158·??? 89·???
[20] [18] [82] [9]
Other controls (all regres-
sions in column):
Lags X X X X X
School variablesd X X X X
Threats to learning X X X
Student demographics X X
Census division dummies X
aFigures in parentheses are standard errors. Sample size is 8305.
bAll regressions include the student’s 10th -grade test score, the student’s school’s mean 10th
-grade test score, and a dummy indicating whether those variables are missing.
cχ2 statistics shown with degrees of freedom in brackets from a Wald test that the additional
covariates are jointly no different than zero († p<0.10, ? p<0.05, ?? p<0.01, ??? p<0.001).
dIncludes dummy variables for fraction of students black, fraction of students who drop
out, fraction of class taking remedial math, and miles between high school and four year col-
lege/university when missing.
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Table 16: Estimated effects of grading standards on high school graduation by
race-semilog modelab
Grading Standard (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Intercept only model
I. Hispanic only
Absolute effect 0·0127 0·0140 0·0143 0·0082 0·0046
(0·0115) (0·0119) (0·0074) (0·0072) (0·0022)
II. Black only
Absolute effect −0·0087 −0·0068 −0·0032 −0·0055 −0·0147
(0·0142) (0·0156) (0·0075) (0·0141) (0·0190)
III. White only
Absolute effect −0·0002 −0·0011 −0·0001 0·0065 0·0068
(0·0063) (0·0067) (0·0029) (0·0021) (0·0062)
B. Growth and intercept
model
I. Hispanic only
Absolute effect 0·0161 0·0103 0·0171 0·0066 −0·0009
(0·0217) (0·0200) (0·0199) (0·0183) (0·0182)
Proportional effect 0·0151 0·0112 0·0231 0·0047 −0·0037
(0·0201) (0·0173) (0·0170) (0·0166) (0·0166)
II. Black only
Absolute effect −0·0059 −0·0032 0·0111 −0·0213 −0·0261
(0·0254) (0·0275) (0·0300) (0·0260) (0·0265)
Proportional effect 0·0158 0·0241 0·0365 0·0218 0·0140
(0·0203) (0·0202) (0·0226) (0·0176) (0·0189)
III. White only
Absolute effect 0·0136 0·0109 0·0138 0·0146 0·0152
(0·0147) (0·0156) (0·0154) (0·0125) (0·0120)
Proportional effect 0·0132 0·0104 0·0138 0·0107 0·0107
(0·0161) (0·0171) (0·0169) (0·0135) (0·0129)
Other controls (all regres-
sions in column):
Lags X X X X X
School variablesc X X X X
Threats to learning X X X
Student demographics X X
Census division dummies X
aFigures in parentheses are standard errors. Sample size is 1836 for panels I, 1095 for panels
II, and 5273 for panels III.
bAll regressions include the student’s 10th -grade test score, the student’s school’s mean 10th
-grade test score, and a dummy indicating whether those variables are missing.
cIncludes dummy variables for fraction of students black, fraction of students who drop
out, fraction of class taking remedial math, and miles between high school and four year col-
lege/university when missing.
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Table 17: Estimated effects of grading standards on college attendance by 1984 by
race-semilog modelab
Grading Standard (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Intercept only model
I. Hispanic only
Absolute effect 0·0080 0·0121 0·0157 0·0119 0·0172
(0·0123) (0·0115) (0·0074) (0·0122) (0·0027)
II. Black only
Absolute effect −0·0337 −0·0250 −0·0196 −0·0269 −0·0111
(0·0211) (0·0210) (0·0160) (0·0215) (0·0105)
III. White only
Absolute effect −0·0075 −0·0119 −0·0104 −0·0013 0·0031
(0·0094) (0·0097) (0·0036) (0·0031) (0·0091)
B. Growth and intercept
model
I. Hispanic only
Absolute effect −0·0029 −0·0008 0·0069 0·0032 0·0058
(0·0210) (0·0203) (0·0205) (0·0214) (0·0219)
Proportional effect −0·0022 0·0007 0·0081 0·0034 0·0043
(0·0194) (0·0186) (0·0188) (0·0212) (0·0214)
II. Black only
Absolute effect −0·0514 −0·0458 −0·0321 −0·0388 −0·0299
(0·0281) (0·0326) (0·0311) (0·0307) (0·0293)
Proportional effect −0·0348 −0·0362 −0·0252 −0·0436 −0·0291
(0·0233) (0·0256) (0·0247) (0·0253) (0·0235)
III. White only
Absolute effect −0·0043 −0·0139 −0·0103 0·0074 0·0127
(0·0163) (0·0170) (0·0173) (0·0163) (0·0161)
Proportional effect −0·0034 −0·0126 −0·0088 0·0068 0·0100
(0·0162) (0·0172) (0·0173) (0·0163) (0·0159)
Other controls (all regres-
sions in column):
Lags X X X X X
School variablesc X X X X
Threats to learning X X X
Student demographics X X
Census division dummies X
aFigures in parentheses are standard errors. Sample size is 1746 for panels I, 1024 for panels
II, and 5086 for panels III.
bAll regressions include the student’s 10th -grade test score, the student’s school’s mean 10th
-grade test score, and a dummy indicating whether those variables are missing.
cIncludes dummy variables for fraction of students black, fraction of students who drop
out, fraction of class taking remedial math, and miles between high school and four year col-
lege/university when missing.
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E Models that drop observations rather than impute
The following two tables show the effects of grading standards on 12th grade test
score, high school graduation, and college attendance for the full sample, by gender,
and by race under different methods of accounting for students with a missing 12th
grade test score or that transferred high schools. These results are described in
Footnote 14 on page 12. Columns one through three present the coefficients for
the absolute effect and columns four through six show the coefficients for the
differential effect. The ‘Base’ refers to the model that is shown in the main body
of this text where imputations were made. The other columns present results
from models that exclude from the outcome regressions either students that had a
missing 12th grade test score or that transferred high schools as indicated by the
column heading. Note that in all results shown in this paper, such students were
excluded from the first stage regression that determined grading standards.
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Table 18: Estimated effects of grading standards on 12th grade test score with
models that drop observations with a missing 12th grade test score or
that transfered high schoolab
Absolute effect Differential effect
Require Require Require Require
Outcome and 12th grade stayed at 12th grade stayed at
Sample Basec test score high school Base test score high school
A. 12th grade test
score
All 0·1621 0·1723 0·1708 0·1281 0·1363 0·1338
(0·0176) (0·0186) (0·0180) (0·0162) (0·0177) (0·0175)
[8589] [7914] [8144] [8589] [7914] [8144]
By Gender
Female 0·1429 0·1661 0·1674 0·1152 0·1402 0·1424
(0·0222) (0·0245) (0·0239) (0·0205) (0·0229) (0·0229)
[4277] [3966] [4069] [4277] [3966] [4069]
Male 0·1794 0·1886 0·1826 0·1395 0·1449 0·1395
(0·0235) (0·0266) (0·0252) (0·0227) (0·0259) (0·0248)
[4312] [3948] [4075] [4312] [3948] [4075]
By Race
Hispanic 0·1546 0·1827 0·1867 0·1050 0·1311 0·1345
(0·0216) (0·0368) (0·0361) (0·0192) (0·0317) (0·0319)
[1809] [1694] [1714] [1809] [1694] [1714]
Black 0·2607 0·2609 0·2796 0·2045 0·2083 0·2222
(0·0477) (0·0487) (0·0490) (0·0430) (0·0446) (0·0460)
[1061] [997] [979] [1061] [997] [979]
White 0·1615 0·1628 0·1566 0·1312 0·1329 0·1278
(0·0204) (0·0215) (0·0203) (0·0197) (0·0216) (0·0202)
[5244] [4803] [5016] [5244] [4803] [5016]
aFigures in parentheses are standard errors. Sample sizes are in brackets.
bAll regressions include lags, school variables, threats to learning, student demographic, and
census division dummy controls. For details on these controls see Appendix B.
cBase refers to the model with the imputations described in Section II.D and used in all the
tables shown in the main text of this paper.
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Table 19: Estimated effects of grading standards on high school graduation and
college attendance by 1984 with models that drop observations with a
missing 12th grade test score or that transfered high schoolab
Absolute effect Differential effect
Require Require Require Require
Outcome and 12th grade stayed at 12th grade stayed at
Sample Basec test score high school Base test score high school
B. High school
graduation
All 0·0107 0·0063 0·0170 0·0126 0·0070 0·0165
(0·0082) (0·0081) (0·0083) (0·0091) (0·0087) (0·0094)
[8679] [7820] [8161] [8679] [7820] [8161]
By Race
Hispanic −0·0019 0·0255 0·0283 −0·0094 0·0227 0·0266
(0·0062) (0·0208) (0·0195) (0·0061) (0·0190) (0·0179)
[1836] [1669] [1720] [1836] [1669] [1720]
Black −0·0257 −0·0271 0·0115 0·0100 0·0048 0·0307
(0·0175) (0·0280) (0·0295) (0·0161) (0·0247) (0·0253)
[1095] [994] [988] [1095] [994] [988]
White 0·0188 0·0020 0·0049 0·0223 0·0099 0·0141
(0·0044) (0·0121) (0·0129) (0·0050) (0·0133) (0·0149)
[5273] [4743] [5023] [5273] [4743] [5023]
C. College atten-
dance
All −0·0075 −0·0085 −0·0078 −0·0029 −0·0025 −0·0024
(0·0119) (0·0117) (0·0115) (0·0115) (0·0111) (0·0110)
[8305] [7539] [7813] [8305] [7539] [7813]
By Race
Hispanic 0·0103 0·0200 0·0084 0·0105 0·0213 0·0126
(0·0082) (0·0216) (0·0212) (0·0077) (0·0192) (0·0191)
[1746] [1594] [1636] [1746] [1594] [1636]
Black −0·0117 −0·0165 −0·0071 −0·0229 −0·0132 −0·0088
(0·0366) (0·0340) (0·0332) (0·0343) (0·0285) (0·0285)
[1024] [939] [928] [1024] [939] [928]
White 0·0008 −0·0130 −0·0145 0·0109 −0·0009 −0·0030
(0·0144) (0·0166) (0·0155) (0·0143) (0·0166) (0·0154)
[5086] [4611] [4844] [5086] [4611] [4844]
aFigures in parentheses are standard errors. Sample sizes are in brackets.
bAll regressions include lags, school variables, threats to learning, student demographic, and
census division dummy controls. For details on these controls see Appendix B.
cBase refers to the model with the imputations described in Section II.D and used in all the
tables shown in the main text of this paper.
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